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A bunch of years ago this Scottish dude named David Hume brought up this problem in meta-ethical philosophy. Basically, he discredited the intellectual foundation of ethical statements. Hume says that whenever a philosopher is trying to prove his system of morality, he usually begins with the normal kind of statements: "Is" and "Is not." These statements are what are called "descriptive." They are understood to be objectively meaningful. Everyone believes that this kind of statement is a valid way of thinking and talking about reality.

Hume goes on to say that even though our philosopher starts with descriptive statements, he ends with normative statements. Normative statements are statements that are based on "ought" as opposed to "is." Normative statements talk about how the world should be. Hume says that even though philosophers make this jump all the time, their derivations of ethics are flawed because normative conclusions cannot come from descriptive properties. The question is, what is the relationship between how the world is, and how it should be? Can statements of "ought" even be derived through a logical process?

Hume's problem has enormous ramifications in all areas of ethics. Can a follower of an Abrahamic religion really say that God's will is a basis for objective morality? Even God fails to explain how to derive normative principles from descriptive principles in the Bible. God's will is descriptive. As Hume would argue, the religious person has no basis for deriving ethics, because there is no explanation of the jump from God's will to how a person ought to behave.

Many logical positivists, for instance, take the position known as "non-cognitive emotivism." That is, they take Hume's arguments one step further. They argue that not only can normative statements not be derived from descriptive principles, normative statements have no meaning. They argue that the concept of "should" is irrelevant to understanding the world, and that statements of morality are emotional rather than cognitive. That is, they are not logically derived statements, but instead they are expressions of an emotional position. According to a non-cognitive emotivist, the statement "killing is unethical" really means something along the lines of "boo killing!" (thank you wikipedia).

Some philosophers claim that the is/ought dichotomy can be bridged. When we talk about goal-oriented behavior, we can say that "In order to achieve A, you should B." This type of statement can be factually verified and corresponds to reality in the same way descriptive statements do. However, this isn't particularly useful for deriving objective ethics, because it gives us no way to determine what goal A should be.

Questions to answer in this thread...
What system of morality do you believe in, and how do you account for the is/ought problem?
What are some ways to go about solving this meta-ethical problem?
Do we need to solve this problem, or can we get by with arbitrary ethics?
Etc...

DemonzLunchBreak wrote:Some philosophers claim that the is/ought dichotomy can be bridged. When we talk about goal-oriented behavior, we can say that "In order to achieve A, you should B." This type of statement can be factually verified and corresponds to reality in the same way descriptive statements do. However, this isn't particularly useful for deriving objective ethics, because it gives us no way to determine what goal A should be.

It's all good, except this diversion. Those philosophers are jumbling semantics. In truth, the sentence would be "The way to achieve A is by B." The word "should" is irrelevant. Probabilities and possibilities can come into play at this juncture, but it doesn't ever boil down to the is/ought dichotomy.

Anyway, I think the "ought" aspect of subjective analysis is how you conspire to reach an "is". There's something absolute we're all observing through our eyeballs. We all have an idea what it ought to be. What most people assume it ought to be, it is. This works on every scale, from concrete perceptions to higher order ethical considerations.

To answer your questions:

I believe in utility and humanism. Utility is what humans ought to acquire.

To solve the problem, you gotta cut the fat. There's a core concept behind the semantics. After you get to the essence of it, what remains is the difference between what truly exists and what one believes exists. "Ought" isn't a hope; it's knowledge that the world is different than perception. It's looking at the painting that everyone says is a picture of flowers and seeing vaginas instead. The world is full of violence. If you think the world ought to be a peaceful place, then you believe the world is a peaceful place and your current perceptions are off. After figuring out an "ought", you endeavor to make your perceptions match your knowledge. That either requires changing what you know (and the facts themselves) or changing what you see and believe (by deluding yourself or altering your opinion).

We don't need to solve the problem. Naive philosophy and naive ethics are the best way to go. You'll find that people have to be ethical to be social. Those who are not ethical are not communicable; those who are functioning well socially must be ethical. Morals are self-regulatory.

I'd say that implicit in an moral system is the axiom "People should behave according to what these morals are". That bridges the gap from the descriptive to the normative.

More later, if I remember.

blue_tetris wrote:Those who are not ethical are not communicable; those who are functioning well socially must be ethical. Morals are self-regulatory.

BAM!

blue_tetris wrote:It's all good, except this diversion. Those philosophers are jumbling semantics. In truth, the sentence would be "The way to achieve A is by B." The word "should" is irrelevant. Probabilities and possibilities can come into play at this juncture, but it doesn't ever boil down to the is/ought dichotomy.

Agreed.

blue_tetris wrote:To solve the problem, you gotta cut the fat. There's a core concept behind the semantics. After you get to the essence of it, what remains is the difference between what truly exists and what one believes exists. "Ought" isn't a hope; it's knowledge that the world is different than perception. It's looking at the painting that everyone says is a picture of flowers and seeing vaginas instead. The world is full of violence. If you think the world ought to be a peaceful place, then you believe the world is a peaceful place and your current perceptions are off. After figuring out an "ought", you endeavor to make your perceptions match your knowledge. That either requires changing what you know (and the facts themselves) or changing what you see and believe (by deluding yourself or altering your opinion).

I'm confused by this. I like this approach. It seems interesting -- but I don't completely understand what you're saying.

The world is full of violence. The world ought to be peaceful. So far we're on the same page, but then you go on to say that I believe the world to be peaceful. This is the step that I don't comprehend. How does "belief about how the world ought to be" translate into "belief about how the world is"? How do perceptions differ from belief? If I perceive that a painting has flowers, then I believe that a painting has flowers in it, even though I would rather see vaginas. I don't generally perceive one thing, and then think that something different exists. I might perceive one form of existence, and desire another, but I try not to make my perceptions differ from what I believe to be true (unless I know there's some problem with my ability to perceive).

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Ian, that seems like a semantic trick to me. "One ought to act according to what these ethical principles are" doesn't satisfactorily bridge this gap for me. That statement cannot be reduced to anything purely descriptive. You might be able to start with that premise, and then work your way towards normative statements, but you can't start there and work your way back to descriptive premises. That's because ethical principles will always have some adjective like "good" or "bad" or "right" or some equivalent.

Ian, that seems like a semantic trick to me. "One ought to act according to what these ethical principles are" doesn't satisfactorily bridge this gap for me. That statement cannot be reduced to anything purely descriptive. You might be able to start with that premise, and then work your way towards normative statements, but you can't start there and work your way back to descriptive premises. That's because ethical principles will always have some adjective like "good" or "bad" or "right" or some equivalent.

It's possible I've misunderstood (although I would say that a fair whack of ethics is semantics). Could you give me an example of how someone might rationalise a belief that demonstrates Hume's guillotine? Would you consider the statement 'murder is bad' to be descriptive or normative?

I would say that when I use the term 'good' or 'bad' they bridge the gap. 'Good' means both 'something that people should aspire to' and 'something that results in a beneficial outcome'. It's the (descriptive) evolutionary viewpoint of memes taken to an idealistic level, where a meme that is descriptively 'successful' is one that normatively 'should' be followed.

Like I said, it could be I'm misunderstanding... but as far as I can see, 'X should be Y' just means 'I would be happier if X was Y' - and that's descriptive.

Could you give me an example of how someone might rationalise a belief that demonstrates Hume's guillotine?

I'm not sure I can.

Would you consider the statement 'murder is bad' to be descriptive or normative?

I dunno. I've always thought of that as equivalent to "one shouldn't murder," so I guess I'll say normative. The fact that it contains "is" is just a syntactical trick of English.

I would say that when I use the term 'good' or 'bad' they bridge the gap. 'Good' means both 'something that people should aspire to' and 'something that results in a beneficial outcome'. It's the (descriptive) evolutionary viewpoint of memes taken to an idealistic level, where a meme that is descriptively 'successful' is one that normatively 'should' be followed.

I see what you're saying. My objection here is that you have two separate definitions for "good." One is descriptive, and one normative, and I don't see how they can be used interchangeably. Correct me if I'm wrong, but to assume that they can be used interchangeably might be problematic, no?

Like I said, it could be I'm misunderstanding... but as far as I can see, 'X should be Y' just means 'I would be happier if X was Y' - and that's descriptive.

I'm not sure that's what people mean when they say "should." Then again, I'm not sure "should" is a meaningful concept.

I'm not sure I can.

This might be the problem, then - we're kinda dealing with a hazy description of something.

Wikipedia puts the problem as "In other words, given our knowledge of the way the world is, how can we know the way the world ought to be?" As far as I'm aware - my reply gets rid of that problem - there is no universal 'ought', there is just my subjective 'it would be nice if things were better'.

I don't know if Hume's Guillotine is opposed to the rationale behind morals in general, or just opposed to the rationale behind the formulation of any 'absolute' moral. I can see it holds some problems for absolutism, because absolutism suggests a framework of morality that is separate from humanity - and our observations are limited to our own human perspective. However, I don't see the issue with moral relativism.

I see what you're saying. My objection here is that you have two separate definitions for "good." One is descriptive, and one normative, and I don't see how they can be used interchangeably. Correct me if I'm wrong, but to assume that they can be used interchangeably might be problematic, no?

I don't see why not. You'd get a few headaches when talking about the morals of those who you disagree with, but you get those anyway.
Looking at these kinda emphasises my point. 58 definitions!

I think it is one of the better philosophies out there on paper, but it doesn't quite work very well in the real world because you HAVE to use these oughts and should be's to determine your actions in life. If you do not use these types of thoughts then you will have no judgement system. Everyone, whether "good" or "bad", has some sort of belief system and world view, and in these world views there are personal oughts that need to be followed to act on anything.

A philosophy that works on paper, but fails in the real world is almost useless when you are trying to apply them, but they can be useful in and of themselves. I think this dichotomy between ought and is is rather interesting to think about, even if it cannot be effectively (or morally) applied.

Ian wrote:Wikipedia puts the problem as "In other words, given our knowledge of the way the world is, how can we know the way the world ought to be?" As far as I'm aware - my reply gets rid of that problem - there is no universal 'ought', there is just my subjective 'it would be nice if things were better'.

I don't know if Hume's Guillotine is opposed to the rationale behind morals in general, or just opposed to the rationale behind the formulation of any 'absolute' moral. I can see it holds some problems for absolutism, because absolutism suggests a framework of morality that is separate from humanity - and our observations are limited to our own human perspective. However, I don't see the issue with moral relativism.

Right. Gotcha. Sorry about how long it's taken me to respond to this.

I don't think Hume's guillotine is opposed to subjective ethics as much as it is opposed to ethical statements having truth value. It represents a problem for any objective set of ethics. If your ethics are "if I like X, then it is good and I should behave in a way that produces more X," I don't think Hume's guillotine presents any problem for you. Instead, the problem is "why should you do what you like?" Basically my issue with moral relativism is that it doesn't provide any rational justification for a system of morality and is not helpful whatsoever in resolving conflict.

Clovic wrote:I think it is one of the better philosophies out there on paper, but it doesn't quite work very well in the real world because you HAVE to use these oughts and should be's to determine your actions in life. If you do not use these types of thoughts then you will have no judgement system. Everyone, whether "good" or "bad", has some sort of belief system and world view, and in these world views there are personal oughts that need to be followed to act on anything.

And this is why it's important to overcome Hume's guillotine somehow. Everyone uses an "ought," whether or not they acknowledge it. Right now my instinct is that the development of some moral axiom(s) is the best way to sidestep the guillotine. Survival, for example, is assumed to be part of the morality of anyone who stays alive, so why can't us live people use it as a starting point? It wouldn't be "true," it would be impossible to deny coherently.

FYI, I'm a moral relativist. That would explain my confusion over the wording of the Guillotine.

Instead, the problem is "why should you do what you like?" Basically my issue with moral relativism is that it doesn't provide any rational justification for a system of morality and is not helpful whatsoever in resolving conflict.

Morals on their own are entirely useless for resolving conflict anyway - it all boils down to both sides saying 'because I want to' , or 'because I believe X to be true'. However, in any society this problem is solved, not by a moral system, but by a legal system.

A society's legal system is still originally founded on morality - the morality of those that control the society. This is the benefit of democracy; it results in the morals of the majority being legalised rather than the morals of an individual dictator. There is also an element of memetic competition between societies - a law which brings a society prosperity will tend to be adapted by another society, lest they be overtaken.
However, once a law has been founded, it ceases to become a moral issue and simply becomes a deterministic one - if you break the law, you are guaranteed to receive a consequence (for a given value of 'guarantee'). This legal system - deterministic, not moral - is the one by which conflicts are resolved.

The way I see it: Morals affect what you think. Everyone follows their own system of morals, though most are similar.
Laws affect what you do. Everyone (in a country) follows the same set of laws; they are the constraint that prevent our individual morals from causing chaos.